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CONOCO INC. V UNITED STATES:




In Conoco Inc. v. United States,' the United States Court of Federal
Claims held that the federal government breached oil and gas lease
contracts it entered into for the offshore areas of North Carolina by taking
actions as required by the Outer Banks Protection Act of 1990 (OBPA). 2
In an attempt to shield itself from liability for this breach of oil lease
contracts, the federal government unsuccessfully attempted to use the
sovereign acts doctrine.' This Note will present the legal background of
the Conoco case and will discuss the sovereign acts doctrine as it relates
to the court's eventual holding. Lastly, this Note will argue that there is
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1998.
1. 35 Fed. Cl. 309 (1996).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 2753 (1994).
3. This doctrine accounts for the two separate roles the government may act in; that
of the sovereign and that of the private contractor. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458
(1925). This doctrine eases the tension between these dual capacities of the government,
establishes the supremacy of the federal government when acting in its sovereign role, and
ultimately represents a method of risk allocation. Ronald G. Morgan, Identifying Protected
GovernmentActs under the Sovereign Acts Doctrine: a Question ofActs andActors, 22 PUB.
CoNT. L.J. 223, 224 (1993). The government will not incur any liability beyond that of
what a private party would face if contracts change because of a corresponding change in
the law. However, the government will be liable for any contractual breach that is the result
of legislation enacted for the specific purpose of changing one of the terms of a particular
contract. The General Accounting Office has described the doctrine's purposes as: "first,
that the government cannot contract away its sovereignty or duty to take acts in the interest
of the public, and second, that the contractor should not be in a better position ... because
his contract is with the government rather than with a private party." 1d. at 229 (citing U.S.
General Accounting Office, Office of the General Counsel, Government Contract Principles
(3d ed.1980)). See infra Part II.B.
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a fundamental problem in the manner in which the Conoco court applied
the sovereign acts doctrine apart from whether or not it would shield the
federal government in this case.
Conoco contributes a body of case law that provides a functional
definition of the sovereign acts doctrine, and continues a trend towards
narrowing the definition of an act that is considered "public and general
in nature." This definition of an act that is "public and general in nature"
directly impacts environmental protection and legislation. Although the
OBPA was enacted with the specific intent to protect the offshore area of
North Carolina from severe environmental damage,4 the court found that
the OBPA was not intended to promote the public interest. Instead, the
court found that the act's sole effect was to obstruct performance of a
specific governmental contract. For this reason, the court held that the
government was liable for significant damages.
Through the judicial analysis in this case, the court takes a narrow
and severe view toward the overall purpose of environmental legislation.
Along with a series of recent decisions,5 the Conoco court's definition of
an act with public and general applicability can be seen as part of a
judicial movement towards narrowing the definition of a sovereign act.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF CONOCO
A. The Statutory Framework
In 1953, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA)6 to promote oil and gas lease sales. In enacting OCSLA,
Congress intended to exercise both the proprietary powers of a landowner
and the police powers of a legislature in regulating leases of publicly
owned resources.7 The 1978 amendments of OCSLA authorized, for OCS
lands, "expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental
safeguards. "
4. 33 U.S.C. § 2753.
5. See infra notes 12, 17, 21, 24, and 31.
6. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1994).
7. Id. § 1334(a).
8. The amendments also established the procedural criteria for the Secretary of the
Interior (Secretary) to follow in granting the offshore leases. Id. § 204, 92 Stat. at 636
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994)). In these procedures, the Secretary was
granted narrow authority to cancel leases upon a finding of a threat of environmental harm.
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Congress responded to North Carolina's particular environmental
concerns by enacting the OPBA in 1990, which was included in the Oil
Pollution Act. 9 The OBPA, without amending the OCSLA,' 0 expressly
prohibited the Department of the Interior (DOI) from approving any plans
of exploration (POEs) or in any way permitting exploration or develop-
ment in North Carolina offshore outer continental shelf (OCS) regions
until, at the earliest, October 1, 1991."
B. Case Law Background of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine
The sovereign acts doctrine has long been used as a defense to
governmental liability for breach of contract in the courts of the United
States. The following cases all involve an assertion of the doctrine and
were relied upon for the judicial decision in Conoco.
In Jones v. United States,'2 an action was brought by two civil
engineers to recover damages from a contract they made with the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs for a survey of land districts described in
Id. §§ 204, 208, 92 Stat. at 636-637, 661 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a),
1351(h) (1994)). These canceled leases had a remedy in the establishment of a statutory
compensation formula. lI § 204, 92 Stat. at 637-638 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §
1334(a)(2)(C) (1994)).
9. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
10. Through the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act the federal government asserts
exclusive jurisdiction over mineral resources over the Outer Continental Shelf. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1994).
11. In 33 U.S.C. § 2753, Congress spelled out its specific reasons for enacting OBPA.
The language of this section provides in part that:
(1) [Ihe Outer Banks of North Carolina is an area of exceptional environmental
fragility and beauty;
(2) the annual economic benefits of commercial and recreational fishing activities
to North Carolina, which could be adversely affected by oil or gas development
offshore the State's coast, exceeds $1,000,000,000;
(3) the major industry in coastal North Carolina is tourism, which is subject to
potentially significant disruption by offshore oil or gas development;
(4) the physical oceanographic characteristics of the area offshore North Carolina
... are not well understood... ;
(5) diverse and abundant fisheries resources occur.., offshore North Carolina
(6) the environmental impact statements prepared for Outer Continental Shelf
lease sales... contain insufficient and outdated environmental information ....
33 U.S.C. § 2753(b) (1994).
12. 1 Ct. Cl. 383 (1865).
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treaties between the United States and several Indian tribes. While the
services required by the contract were fully performed and the price
contracted for was fully paid, the plaintiffs sued for additional compensa-
tion for costs incurred as a result of a government troop withdrawal
contrary to the terms of the Indian treaties.
The Court of Claims held that "[w]hatever acts the government may
do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be public and general,
cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct or violate the
particular contracts into which it enters with private persons."' 3 The court
found that in this case the United States was appearing only in its contrac-
tor capacity and thus should be seen as would any other private defendant.
The court fashioned the primary standard that "[w]herever the public and
private acts of the government seem to commingle, a citizen or corporate
body must by supposition be substituted in its place, and then the question
must be determined whether the action will lie against the supposed
defendant."14 Through this substitution test, the court sought to make the
frequently misapprehended distinction between the public acts and the
private contracts of the government so broad and distinct that the two
could not be confused.'5 The federal government, when acting in a
contracting capacity, cannot be held liable directly or indirectly for the
public acts of the United States as a sovereign. 16
In Horowitz v. United States,' 7 the Court further refined the doctrine
set forth in Jones. This case involved an action to recover damages
caused by a governmental delay in silk delivery, which allegedly consti-
tuted a breach of contract by the Ordinance Department of the United
States government.' 8 Apparently after the contract for shipment was
made, the federal government, through the U.S. Railroad Administration,
placed an embargo on silk by freight.' 9 The Supreme Court, relying on
Jones v. United States, held that the United States, when sued as a
contractor, cannot be held liable for an obstruction to performance of the
13. Id. at 384.
14. Id. at 385.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 267 U.S. 458 (1925).
18. Id. at 459-60.
19. Id. at 460. The price of silk subsequently declined greatly and Horowitz was
forced to take a loss of over $10,000. Id.
Conoco v. United States
contract which results from a sovereign act which is public and general."
Thus, the Court expanded the doctrine by looking at the governmental act
in question to see if it was of public and general utility.
This judicial inquiry of whether an act has public and general utility
was also the ultimate factor in the outcome of Sun Oil Co. v. United
States.2 Sun Oil involved an action by three oil companies to recover
damages and/or just compensation for the delay and the denial of permits
to establish and operate offshore oil platforms as allowed by relevant lease
terms and OCSLA.' For the breach of contract claim brought before it,
the court held that denying an application to build a second platform was
unjustified on the merits. Although the federal government argued that
the sovereign acts doctrine allowed the government to escape liability for
breach, the court held otherwise, declaring that the actions taken by the
Secretary were "not actions of public and general applicability, but were
actions directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs' contractual right to
install a platform.., and to extract oil and gas therefrom. The doctrine
of sovereign immunity does not insulate defendant from liability in such
instances."23
In Sun Oil Co. and in Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States,2' the
court found the government's defenses lacking after applying this public
and general test. In Everett, a governmental timber contract was reformu-
lated after it was forecasted to cause environmental damage. After
reviewing the facts, the Everett court found "it is obvious that the act in
question was neither public nor general-the government unilaterally
terminated one contract after deciding continued performance would have
been unwise. "'r Here, as in Sun Oil Co., the government's arguments
20. Id at 461. The court again followed the reasoning of Jones: "Whatever acts the
government may do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be public and general,
cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct or violate the particular contracts into
which it enters with private persons." Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, I Ct. Cl. at 384).
Because the court in this instance found that the embargo on silk by rail was an act public
and general in nature, the government was held not liable for the resulting breach of
contract. Id at 461.
21. 572 F.2d 786 (1978).
22. Id. at 792-93. This case arose in California and followed the 1969 Union Oil
platform blowout off the coast of Santa Barbara and the subsequent review and reconsidera-
tion of federal leases and leasing procedures. Id at 797-98. This case also occurred prior
to the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
23. Id at 817.
24. 651 F.2d 723 (CL Cl. 1981).
25. Id at 731-32.
1997]
280 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:275
based upon the doctrines of frustration,' or sovereign acts, would not
cancel the contract without liability for breach.27
In Hughes Communication Galaxy, Inc., v. United States," the court
added an additional inquiry into the use of the sovereign acts doctrine.
The court would now look at the contract in question in order to deter-
mine if there was any governmental surrender of sovereignty in an
unmistakable manner that would preclude the government from asserting
the sovereign acts defense.
This important case involved a contract between Hughes Communica-
tion Galaxy (Hughes) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA). In its contract, NASA agreed to use its best efforts to
launch Hughes' satellites through the use of the Space Shuttle according
to the "United States policy governing launch assistance approved by the
President of the United States on August 6, 1982. ,29 When the Space
Shuttle Challenger explosion occurred, it prompted the President to issue
an order stating that NASA would no longer launch commercial space-
craft. 30 Because of this new policy, several of Hughes' spacecraft were
not able to be carried by the Space Shuttle. Hughes subsequently brought
26. This doctrine is used to excuse performance where performance still remains
possible, but the value of the performance to at least one of the parties and the basic reason
for entering into the contract for both parties has been destroyed by an unforeseen and
supervening event. Id. at 728.
27. It is also important to note the discussion in Everett Plywood on the distinction
between an act that is "public and general in nature" and one that is not. The court remarks,
"[i]t would have been an entirely different case if Congress had passed a law immediately
prohibiting all cutting in all public forests, but this unilateral termination does not constitute
a sovereign act that excuses the government from breach damages." Id. at 732. In this
manner, the court attempts to give guidance to potential plaintiffs, the government, and other
courts as to what makes an act "public and general."
28. 998 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
29. President Reagan issued this policy, entitled "Space Assistance and Cooperation
Policy." It stated:
With respect to the priority and scheduling for launching foreign payloads at U.S.
launch sites, such launchings will be dealt with on the same basis as U.S.
launchings. Each launching will be treated in terms of its own requirements and
as an individual case. Once a payload is scheduled for launch, the launching
agency will use its best effort to meet the scheduling commitments. Should events
arise which require rescheduling, the U.S. will consult with all affected users in
an attempt to meet the needs of users in an equitable manner.
Id. at 956 (footnote omitted). The unique contract contained a cut-off date after which
NASA's obligations would expire whether or not the satellites were still unlaunched. Id.
30. Id.
Conoco v. United States
an action for damages against the federal government after NASA
informed it that its satellites would not be launched due to this Presidential
revision of Space Shuttle payload policy.
The court found that the clause in the launch services agreement
shifted the financial responsibility to the government for any changes in
launches and launch priority resulting from a policy change or revision.
The defense of the sovereign acts doctrine could not be used by the
government to escape liability in this instance, because here the court
determined that any future use of the doctrine was surrendered in the
language of the contract in unmistakable terms31 that required that the
government provide launch scheduling in accordance with the August 6,
1982 Presidential decree. 2
In United States v. Winstar, the Supreme Court combined the reason-
ing behind Jones, Horowitz, and Hughes to apply both the public and
general test to the act in question and to add the second consideration of
whether there was any surrender of the defense by the government in the
contract terms. Additionally, the Court looked at a new factor, govern-
mental self-interest, when it decided whether the act was public and
general.
During the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board encouraged healthy thrifts and outside investors to take
over ailing thrifts by allowing them to designate the excess of the purchase
price over the fair market value of identifiable assets as supervisory
goodwill and to count such goodwill toward the capital reserve require-
ments imposed by federal regulations. The Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) subsequently disal-
lowed this practice.33 Three thrifts sued for breach of contract.'
The Court in Winstar stated that the sovereign acts defense could not
prevail because the facts of the case did not warrant its application.35 In
31. The unmistakability doctrine is a special rule dealing with government contracts
which holds that "surrenders of sovereign authority must appear in unmistakable terms."
United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2479 (1996) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. Hughes Communication Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d at 958.
33. 12 U.S.C § 1464(t)(1)(A).
34. These thrifts included Glendale Federal Bank, Federal Savings Bank, the Winstar
Corporation, and The Statesman Group. United States v. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447.
35. Again, the Supreme Court reiterated the Horowitz and the Jones tests and stated
that:
The sovereign acts doctrine thus balances the Government's need for freedom to
legislate with its obligation to honor its contracts by asking whether the sovereign
19971
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the Court's view, FIRREA was not an act that was "public or general."
The Court noted that even if FIRREA was found to be "public and
general," the legal impossibility defense could not be applied to protect the
United States from liability. The Court reasoned that because the object
of the doctrine is to place the government as contractor on the same
footing as that of a private contractor, the government, like any other
contractor, "must show that the passage of the statute rendering its
performance impossible was an event contrary to the basic assumptions on
which the parties agreed, and must ultimately show that the language or
circumstances do not indicate that the Government should be liable in any
case." 36 The Court found that the government had not met these condi-
tions because some changes in the regulatory structure of thrifts was
foreseeable and probable.37 As the Court stated:
Finally, any governmental contract that not only deals with
regulatory change but allocates the risk of its occurrence will, by
definition, fail the further condition of a successful impossibility
defense, for it will indeed indicate that the parties' agreement was
not meant to be rendered nugatory by a change in the regulatory
law.38
The sovereign acts doctrine was looked at from a new angle in Winstar.
Under this new approach, the defense would not hold up if there was a
judicial determination of the statute being "tainted by a governmental
act is properly attributable to the government as contractor. If the answer is no,
the government's defense to liability depends on the answer to the further
question, whether that act would otherwise release the Government from liability
under ordinary principles of contract law.
Id. at 2465.
36. Id. at 2469.
37. Id. at 2470. The Supreme Court, in a relevant footnote, offered an alternate
position to reviewing courts. It is this alternate position that is relied on in Conoco. This
principle states that a court may hold that a governmental action was not "public and
general" under Horowitz if its primary purpose or effect was to avoid the Government's
contractual commitments. However, the Supreme Court realized the difficulty that would
result from applying this test due to the required judicial determination of relative intent. Id
at 2467 n.46. The Court in Winstar holds that the government will not be liable as long as
the impact on a governmental contract is "merely incidental to the accomplishment of a
broader governmental objective." Id. at 2466.
38. Id. at 2471.
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object of self-relief' rather than being "regulatory legislation that is
relatively free of government self-interest."39
I. CONOCO INC. V. UNITED STATES
A. Background
In August 1981, August 1982, and September 1983, the government
of the United States conducted lease sales for fifty-three tracts off the
coast of North Carolina. 4' This lease sale was conducted pursuant to
OCSLA, which specifically authorizes the Secretary to sell leases for oil
and gas exploration within the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). 41 Conoco,
along with other plaintiffs,42 paid more than $354,000,000 for these leases
and more than $8,000,000 in annual rentals. In order to allow these lands
to be leased, Conoco and the Secretary had to follow numerous proce-
dural requirements mandated by OCSLA. 43
39. Id at 2465.
40. Over the past forty-two years, more than one hundred leases for oil and gas
exploration have been issued pursuant to the OCSLA regime. Over $55 billion has been
paid to the United States government for such leases. Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed.
C. 309,316 (1996).
41. The OCS is the submerged land beneath navigable waters on the Continental Shelf
beginning seaward of the coastal waters of states. Coastal states have jurisdiction over the
waters and the submerged land out to within three miles of their coasts. The OCS extends
beyond this three miles. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), (b), 1331(a) 1994.
42. Nine other oil companies filed suit as third-party plaintiffs. These third-party
plaintiffs included: Amerada Hess Corporation, Chevron USA Inc., Marathon Oil Company,
Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc., Murphy Exploration & Production Company,
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., OXY USA Inc., Pennzoil Exploration & Production Company, and
Shell Offshore Inc. On October 28, 1995, eight more companies filed motions to intervene.
The court granted the motion to allow Amoco Production Company, Mobil Oil Corporation,
Mobil Exploration & Producing North America Inc., Mobil Exploration & Producing
Southeast Inc., Shell Frontier Oil & Gas Inc., Shell Western E & P Inc., Texaco Exploration
and Production, Texaco Inc., and Union Oil Company of California to become intervenors
in the case. Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. at 315.
43. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). Under the OCSLA system a competitive bidding system
is used to sell leases. Id § 1337. This system is a complicated process involving the
Secretary and many other agencies. The Secretary must establish a five-year plan for each
leasing program that contains a schedule of lease sales that reflects the proper balance
between "the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and
gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone." Id § 1334(a). The DOI issues
the OCS leases on standard, non-negotiable lease forms that it prepares. The United States
of America is the "lessor" and the "lease area" is generally a three-square mile tract. Terms
19971 283
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Before exploiting or exploring under OCSLA, a lessee must obtain
approval by the DOI and any other involved state or federal agencies. If
the lessee wants to pursue oil and gas development and production, it must
have a subsequent development and a production plan approved by the
Secretary.'
In this instance, Conoco successfully bid on tract regions off the coast
of North Carolina and entered into a contractual lease agreement4' with
the federal government.' Along with twenty owners of North Carolina
leases, Conoco proposed to drill one exploratory well about forty-five
miles east of Cape Hatteras. During this time period, increasing objec-
tions mounted against the proposed exploratory drilling and the North
Carolina leases in general. In August 1990, due to an environmental
outcry, Congress passed the OBPA. This legislation was part of the more
comprehensive Oil Pollution Act, and in the North Carolina region,
specifically prohibited the DOI from approving any POEs or other
exploration, production, or development of the Outer Continental Shelf
offshore until October 1, 1991.47
of the lease range from five to ten years and are extendible as long as drilling is actually
taking place. Periodic lease payments and cash bonuses are required from all OCS lessees.
Id. § 1337.
44. Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. at 317.
45. Section Two of the lease listed the rights of the Lessee:
The Lessor hereby grants and leases to the Lessee the exclusive right and privilege
to drill for, develop, and produce oil and gas resources .... These rights include:
(a) the nonexclusive right to conduct within the leased area geological
and geophysical explorations in accordance with applicable regulations;
(b) the nonexclusive right to drill water wells within the leased area.
. .;and
(c) the right to construct or erect and to maintain within the leased area
artificial islands, installations, and other devices permanently or
temporarily attached to the seabed ....
Id. at 317-18.
46. The lease entered into was not adjacent to any other offshore areas of production.
Id. at 316.
47. The passage of the OBPA came immediately before the submission to the
Secretary of a POE for the exploratory well. Id. at 318. All operations under Conoco's
North Carolina leases were suspended. Exploration activity would only be allowed to
resume after the Secretary certified to Congress that he had adequate information to carry
out OCSLA responsibilities in approving POEs. The OBPA provides, in part, that the
Secretary shall not conduct any new lease sales, issue any new leases, approve any
exploration plans, approve any development and production plans, approve any applications
for a permit to drill, or permit any drilling for oil or gas under the OCSLA on any OCS lands
offshore of North Carolina. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1994).
Conoco v. United States
B. Arguments Presented on Appeal
Plaintiff Conoco's arguments, in essence, stated that the passage of
OBPA materially breached a binding contract, made it impossible for
them to take advantage of their offshore leases, and interfered with the
Secretary's ability to perform his contractual duties under the OCS
leases. 8 Conoco argued that while the OBPA did not expressly repeal
OCSLA (the statute under which the leases were granted) it did make
performance of the contracts impossible. 9 According to Conoco, the
express terms of the OCSLA leases, and the circumstances under which
they were made, contractually forced the United States to fairly consider
and expeditiously act upon Conoco's POEs as well as any other subse-
quent plans for development. Therefore, Conoco asserted that the
government's failure to at least give fair consideration to their POE was
a material breach of contract.5' Conoco further maintained that the United
States, through passage of the OBPA, had deliberately prevented Conoco
from receiving any benefit from their leases.
In the alternative, Conoco argued that the passage of OBPA frustrated
their performance of the lease because the principal purpose of the lease,
oil exploitation, was delayed.5 Therefore, the contracts should be
nullified and restitution should be granted. Lastly, Conoco stated that
both of the defenses raised by the government, the sovereign acts doctrine
and the unmistakability doctrines, had no merit.52
The United States contended that the OCS leases never granted
Conoco absolute rights to explore and develop the lease areas. The
government countered that the lease sale is merely one stage in the OCS
administrative process which is separate from the federal permitting stage
to develop or explore. Conoco knew, when purchasing the leases, that
they might never be able to exploit them because no guarantee was ever
given in the OCS lease that such exploitation would be permitted.53 The
48. Conoco filed suit against the federal government alleging that the passage of
OBPA materially breached the leasing contracts, frustrated performance thereof, rendered
such performance impracticable, or constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment





53. Id at 320.
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government asserted that the plaintiffs were aware that the environmental
impacts associated with their proposed development had to be carefully
studied and that their permits could be denied because of numerous
environmental requirements.54 Further, the leases clearly state that they
are subject to OCSLA, and all other applicable statutes and regulations.
Therefore, Conoco's defined rights and expectancies, as set out by the
lease agreement, were extremely limited and all government actions, such
as the subsequent enactment of OBPA, were contemplated by the lease
agreements.55
The government further argued that it did not breach the lease
contracts by suspending the leases because suspension is incorporated into
the lease agreement. Merely suspending the leases did not bar exploration
and development, but only imposed additional DOI requirements before
it could approve a drilling permit. 6 Finally, the government stated that
the delay in exploration was not solely attributable to the OBPA but was
also the result of Conoco's inability to obtain compliance with North
Carolina's Coastal Area Management Act. 57
In the event of a finding of breach, the government asserted that the
sovereign acts doctrine and the doctrine of unmistakability were a shield
from liability in this case.58 The government maintained that because the
OBPA was "public and general in nature" and because the government did
not contractually waive its sovereign immunity in the lease terms, the
government is not liable for breach.
C. The Court's Opinion
The Court of Federal Claims found in favor of plaintiff Conoco,
holding that the OBPA legislation was not considered when making the
lease contracts, that compliance with OBPA compelled governmental
breach by non-performance accompanied by an anticipatory repudiation,
and that the government, at the very least, was contractually obligated to
timely and fairly consider Conoco's POEs. Any suspension of the North




57. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 113A-100 to 134.4 (1996).
58. Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. CI. at 320.
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In addition, the court held that the government could not escape liability
under the sovereign acts doctrine.
The court first ascertained the exact meaning of the relevant lease
terms to see if there was a breach. In doing so, the court agreed with
Conoco's interpretation of the leases.59 The court found that the plain
meaning interpretation of the clause referring to "all other applicable
statutes and regulations" makes no mention of future or subsequent
legislation which might affect parties' rights and procedures.' More
importantly, the court found that at the time of execution of the leases
neither side envisioned the passage of OBPA.61 The court held that the
lease contracts could not be read to allow the government, through
passage of the OBPA, to so drastically interfere with and narrow the
lessees' bargained-for rights of exploitation.
While the lease agreements do not specifically state the parties'
obligations regarding the exploration plans under the OCSLA, exploration
may only be conducted in compliance with approved plans of exploration.
Thus, Conoco is obligated to prepare and submit exploration plans. The
court found a corresponding reciprocal obligation on the part the govern-
ment to timely and fairly consider the POEs properly submitted before it.62
The passage of the OBPA imposed severe new conditions upon the DOI's
obligation to approve such POEs; conditions not contemplated by the
parties at the time of lease execution.63 Further, the court held that the
suspensions were not done according to the lease terms because they did
not point to any environmental threats, risks of harm to life or the
environment, or any other justifications found in the OCSLA
regulations.' Thus, they were neither agreed to by Conoco nor incorpor-
59. Id at 324.
60. Id. at 322. A forward-looking reading of these provisions would also be
inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the lease which is to promote the discovery of
new hydrocarbon resources. Iad at 323.
61. Id
62. Id. at 327.
63. Id. at 328.
64. Id. "The leases contain a provision relating to suspending the leases, according
to which '[t]he Lessor may suspend or cancel this lease pursuant to Section 5 of the
[OCSLA] and compensation shall be paid when provided by the Act.'" Id. Because the
court found that the leases were only subject to statutes then-existing, the extent to which
the suspensions were proper depends on whether they were made as required by OCSLA
and its regulations. Here, the court found that the suspensions were not of the type
contemplated by the OCSLA because they were open-ended, indefinite bars, and that the
suspension notices sent to plaintiffs were not invoked pursuant to any justification set forth
19971]
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ated into the bargain at the time of lease formation.65 The government's
assertion that the leases were suspended to conduct further environmental
studies, was found to be unpersuasive.66
After finding a breach by the government, the court ruled that the
sovereign acts doctrine did not shield the government from liability. The
court distinguished between two types of governmental action; govern-
ment action as sovereign versus government action as contractor. Relying
on Sun Oil, the court stated that "governmental acts that directly or
intentionally, as opposed to incidentally, impede specific contracts rather
than promote the public interest are not sovereign acts within the meaning
of the defense. A fortiori, a governmental act whose effect was specifi-
cally designed to obstruct performance is not a sovereign act."'67
The court further proposed the broad theory that the government,
through its assertion of the sovereign acts doctrine, was arguing that all
laws affecting the environment should be considered sovereign acts
immune from liability. The court addressed this proposition by stating:
"It is not true, however, that all of the governments' actions taken to
protect the environment are sovereign acts." 61
In the end, the court found that while the OBPA may have been
developed to address environmental concerns, it was not an act of public
and general applicability. At most, it was found that the act affected the
public welfare incidentally.69 The court thus denied the government's
motion for summary judgment and granted third party plaintiffs' cross-
motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claims.7"
IV. DISCUSSION
The court was correct in its determination and reliance on the
aforementioned case law to hold that the United States government
materially breached the OCS lease contracts with Conoco. However, the
in the regulations of OCSLA. Id. at 328-29.
65. Id. at 329.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 335.
68. Id. at 336.
69. The court went onto state that the OBPA "was 'principally and primarily' enacted
to restrict the SOI's ability to act on plaintiffs' POEs.... It was specifically enacted to delay
indefinitely plaintiffs' exploration of the OCS offshore North Carolina." Id.
70. Damages to be awarded were to be decided at a formal status conference. Conoco
Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. at 337.
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court improperly relied on the case law to show that the doctrine of
sovereign acts does not apply in this case. As feared in Jones, the court
here engaged in a muddled sovereign acts analysis.7 1 A close look at the
cited cases in the Conoco opinion shows that judicial reliance upon them
is unpersuasive. In Jones, Horowitz, and Sun Oil, the courts specifically
mandated a broad definition of the term "public and general in nature" and
gave significant judicial deference to the reasoning behind the Executive
and Legislative actions.
In addition, under the relevant case law, the court should have applied
two fundamental tests to the passage of OBPA and the government's
subsequent assertion of the sovereign acts doctrine. The first test is
whether the government is acting in its contracting role. The second test
is whether the act in question will release the government from liability
under ordinary principles of contract law.'
In the Conoco case, the government was acting in its contractor role
as a result of its contractual relationship with oil companies for OCS oil
exploration. Yet, as an additional part of this inquiry, the court must
further inquire into the nature of the act. Was the act in question "public
and general in nature?" This is a decisive issue in the case, and here the
court narrows the application of the sovereign acts doctrine through its
restrictive definition of the phrase "public and general."
As a result of this narrow judicial inquiry, the OBPA, with its
dedication to the preservation of the offshore resources and environmental
benefits of the North Carolina coast, was found by the court to not be
public and general in nature. The court looked at the effect of the statute
in a narrow perspective, focusing primarily on the effect to Conoco.
Even though the preservation of the North Carolina offshore environment
is beneficial to fishery resources, the tourism industry, and to regional and
migratory populations of marine mammals, the court held that the OBPA
was not broad or general enough. By narrowly focusing on the monetary
effect to the contractor bringing suit, and not on the broad purpose of the
legislation, the Conoco court overlooked the long-term, nationwide,
environmental and economic implications of this important act.73 In so
doing, the court determined that the primary effect and purpose of OBPA
71. Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. CI. 383, 385 (1865).
72. United States v. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2465 (1996).
73. Conoco Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. C1. at 335-36.
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was to specifically avoid the government's contractual lease commit-
ments.74
In finding no public and general act, the court overlooked the subtle,
yet significant, wide-ranging public benefits of the OBPA. A reduction
in the environmental stresses associated with oil exploration in this one
area would promote a corresponding net benefit to the marine resources
of the Mid-Atlantic region, and possibly to the entire nation. Living
marine resources have no boundaries and thus the positive benefits of the
OBPA are not limited to the immediate locality of North Carolina. By
looking narrowly at the specific region highlighted in the OBPA, the court
neglected to take into account the over-arching benefit that this legislation
has, and was intended to have, for the whole of marine living resources.
This judicial intent analysis imposes severe limitations on the usage
of the sovereign acts doctrine. It has invited, and will continue to
promote, judicial speculation. The Supreme Court has described this
analysis as difficult to do.75 Additionally, it limits the judicial deference
traditionally paid to the other branches of the government in applications
of this defense.76 Furthermore, the court in Conoco made this determina-
tion of congressional intent without engaging in a detailed or thorough
analysis of the OBPA or its legislative history.77 By judging the intent of
OBPA by its contractual effects, the court entered onto dangerous ground
because the court's ultimate conclusion could easily have been the product
of a result-oriented analysis.
In Conoco, the elements of the court's analysis were correct, but they
were applied in the wrong sequence. After finding that there was a
breach of contract, the court should have then applied the initial test of the
sovereign acts doctrine. If the passage of the OBPA passed this test, then
the court should have looked to see if the act would release the govern-
ment from liability under ordinary principles of contract law as developed
in Winstar.78
Instead, the court reversed the order of this test by first looking at the
lease terms and determining whether the OBPA was foreseeable. In doing
so, the court determined that no future legislation on oil exploration was
74. Id. at 336.
75. United States v. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2467 n.46.
76. See supra notes 12 and 21 and accompanying text.
77. See Act of August 3, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. ( 104 Stat.)
839.
78. United States v. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2469.
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foreseeable by either party. In this manner, the court limited the way in
which the doctrine was applied. If the court's analysis had proceeded
with a test of the doctrine first, followed by an analysis of contract
principles, the court might have realized that such a restrictive view of the
term "public and general in nature" was unnecessary.
This decision sets dangerous precedent for environmental statutes
enacted to remedy environmental harm. The potential costs of paying
damages for contract breaches arising from subsequent environmental
legislation must now be factored into proposed regulatory reform.
Furthermore, the approach of Conoco suggests that courts may look only
to the effect of legislation on contracts in a sovereign acts doctrine
analysis without giving due consideration to the broad intent of Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court erred in its analysis in Conoco. It did not look carefully
enough at the subsequent statute in question to determine the exact
legislative intent. In neglecting this congressional intent analysis, the
court had an easy time construing the phrase "public and general in
nature" narrowly, and thereby continued the judicial trend toward a
restrictive application of the sovereign acts doctrine.
The court still could have decided that the government was liable in
Conoco. Yet, the opinion would be of much greater weight if the analysis
was done in a different manner. The Outer Banks Protection Act was
subsequently repealed on April 26 and May 2, 1996.' 9 While it is claimed
that this statute was repealed because the mandate it called for had been
fulfilled,' some could argue that the holding in this case compelled
Congress to take such action.
79. 33 U.S.C. § 2753 (1996).
80. H.R. Rep. No. 104-173, at 46 (1995).
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